Summary
Twice a year the Reserve Bank of Australia publishes its assessment of risks to the financial system. The March 2026 edition gave sustained attention to our corner of the market, private credit and non-bank lending, and its findings deserve accurate summary rather than a defensive press release.1,2,3
| What the Review found | Our reading of it |
|---|---|
| Non-bank and private credit lending has continued to grow strongly, increasing the availability of credit for housing and business borrowers. | Accurate. The sector is growing quickly, ours included. |
| That increased availability could mean higher loan losses in the years ahead, though the sector’s relatively small size limits the risk to the wider system. | A fair statement of how credit cycles work. Fast growing lending is where standards slip first. |
| Competition in commercial property finance has led some lenders to loosen loan covenants and lower presale requirements for residential developments. | A specific, checkable observation about our market segment, and a useful one. |
| Information is more limited on lending by non-bank lenders, and private credit firms in particular. | The core finding. The regulator cannot see most private books, and neither can the investors funding them. |
Section 01 expands on why the information gap exists. Section 02 is the substantive answer: ten numbers that make a mortgage fund’s lending standards visible, and a dated commitment to publish Oxford’s own, quarterly, on the public research page where this paper sits, from the fund’s first loan onward.
What this paper does not claim: that regulation is unnecessary, or that our sector’s growth contains no risk. A fund that cannot survive scrutiny of its lending standards is not being harmed by the scrutiny.
Mar 26
Financial Stability Review cited
10
Numbers on the disclosure list
Qtly
Publication frequency committed
Loan 1
Publication starts with the first loan
Section 01
Why the regulator cannot see us, and why that is our problem.
The information gap the Review describes is built into how private credit works, and none of its causes involve wrongdoing. The comparison below shows the difference in plain terms.
| Visibility item | A Bank | A typical private mortgage fund |
|---|---|---|
| Reports lending data to APRA | Yes, in detail, continuously | No |
| Credit rating on the institution | Yes, monitored | Usually none |
| Loan book statistics published | Yes, half yearly at minimum | At the manager’s discretion |
| Prices marked by a market | Listed securities, daily | No traded prices |
| Who can check the lending standards | APRA, ratings agencies, analysts, the market | The manager, and anyone the manager chooses to show |
The last row carries the weight. When the Review says information is limited, it means the checking function that surrounds a bank simply has no counterpart here unless managers create one voluntarily. Investors face the same wall: they can see the sector’s marketing easily and its lending standards barely.
Plain English · why we volunteer
Disclosure sorts managers. Publishing the ten numbers below is straightforward for a fund whose book matches its marketing, and uncomfortable for a fund whose book does not. A manager who declines to publish them is providing information of a different kind. We would rather be in the first group, checkably.
Section 02
The ten numbers, and what each one protects against.
| Disclosure | What it shows an investor | What its absence can hide |
|---|---|---|
| 1 · Weighted average LVR, plus the spread and the maximum | The size of the equity buffer on every loan, and the worst case in the book | A 65 average assembled from 50s and 85s |
| 2 · Arrears at 30, 60 and 90 days, by value | Whether borrowers are paying on time | Stress building behind a smooth return line |
| 3 · Largest loan and top ten as a share of the book | How much rides on any single borrower | A fund that is, in substance, three loans |
| 4 · Geographic and property type split | Where the security properties actually are | Concentration underneath a citywide label |
| 5 · Construction and development share, with presale and cost to complete rules | Exposure to the segment where the Review saw conditions loosen | Development risk priced as if it were investment risk |
| 6 · Ranking: the share of the book that is first registered | Position in the recovery queue, per Paper 05 | Second mortgages pooled under the word secured |
| 7 · Valuation policy: panel, independence, rotation, maximum age | Whether the value under every LVR is current and arm’s length | Stale or accommodating valuations |
| 8 · Related party exposures, by name and amount, or a signed zero | Whose projects the fund is financing | The most common single failure in the sector’s history |
| 9 · Extension and rollover rates | Whether loans repay in cash or roll into new terms | Renewals presented as performance |
| 10 · Cash held and the loss reserve policy | The fund’s own liquidity and its buffer after borrower equity | A fully lent fund with no shock absorber |
Section 03
The commitment, with dates attached.
Oxford will publish its own figures against all ten lines, quarterly, on this research page, beginning with the fund’s first loan. The first table will describe a very small book, and its percentages will be lumpy for exactly that reason. We regard publishing the early, unimpressive versions as part of the point: a disclosure habit that starts only once the numbers look good is a marketing schedule.
| Milestone | What gets published | Where |
|---|---|---|
| First loan settles | The ten line table, opening edition | oxfordcap.com.au/research, beside this paper |
| Every quarter after | The full table, updated, with the prior quarter kept visible | Same page, dated |
| Annually | Valuation panel list and policy, reviewed | Same page |
For investors comparing managers, the list also works in reverse, as a set of questions to put to anyone offering a mortgage fund. The answers worth attention are specific numbers with dates. Answers that arrive as adjectives, conservative, disciplined, rigorous, are a different kind of information, and worth exactly what they cost to produce.
The Review asked, in effect, whether private credit’s lending standards can withstand being looked at. Our answer is a table, updated quarterly, in public, checkable against the land titles register where Paper 05 shows every ranking claim can be verified. We think that is the standard the sector should converge on, and we are content to be held to it first.
Sources and method.
- Reserve Bank of Australia, Financial Stability Review, March 2026, assessment chapter: growth of non-bank and private credit lending, the potential for higher loan losses ahead, and the limited systemic risk given the sector’s size.
- Reserve Bank of Australia, Financial Stability Review, March 2026, household and business chapter: competition in commercial property finance, loosened covenants and lowered presale requirements at some lenders, and more limited information on non-bank and private credit lending.
- Reserve Bank of Australia, Financial Stability Review, March 2026: non-bank credit growth outpacing bank credit growth.
Method notes.
Summaries of the Review are paraphrases and the original text governs. The disclosure list is Oxford’s construction, informed by ASIC Regulatory Guide 45’s benchmark model for unlisted mortgage schemes, which formally applies to retail schemes; this fund is wholesale and adopts the reporting voluntarily. The publication commitment covers the fact and frequency of publication; the format is subject to trustee and licensee approval. Nothing in this paper is a representation about the future composition of the fund’s loan book.
Disclosure.
This paper is issued by Oxford Capital Pty Ltd (ACN 700 065 872). Oxford Capital Pty Ltd is the investment manager of the fund and a corporate authorised representative (CAR No. 1323556) of Non Correlated Advisors Pty Ltd ACN 158 314 982, AFSL 430126. It does not hold an Australian Financial Services Licence of its own. The trustee of the fund, and the issuer of units in it, is Non Correlated Capital Pty Ltd ABN 99 143 882 562, AFSL 499882. This document is general information and commentary only. It is not financial product advice, does not take into account any person’s objectives, financial situation or needs, and is not an offer or invitation to acquire any financial product. Any interest in a fund managed by Oxford Capital will be offered only to wholesale or sophisticated investors within the meaning of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Oxford Capital is a lender against Australian property and has an interest in investors considering private credit; readers should weigh this paper accordingly. Figures are drawn from third party sources believed reliable but not independently audited. Past performance is not an indicator of future performance. Nothing here is a statement that any investment is safe or that capital is protected.
OC-RP-06 · August 2026 · Second edition